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Abstract
Autonomous mechanisms have been proposed to regulate certain aspects of society and are already being used to regulate 
business organisations. We take seriously recent proposals for algorithmic regulation of society, and we identify the exist-
ing technologies that can be used to implement them, most of them originally introduced in business contexts. We build on 
the notion of ‘social machine’ and we connect it to various ongoing trends and ideas, including crowdsourced task-work, 
social compiler, mechanism design, reputation management systems, and social scoring. After showing how all the building 
blocks of algorithmic regulation are already well in place, we discuss the possible implications for human autonomy and 
social order. The main contribution of this paper is to identify convergent social and technical trends that are leading towards 
social regulation by algorithms, and to discuss the possible social, political, and ethical consequences of taking this path.
Keywords Algorithmic regulation · Social machines · Autonomous agents · Artificial intelligence · Social scoring · 
Autonomy · Democracy
1 Introduction
A recent article by historian Yuval Harari argues that “the 
conflict between democracy and dictatorship” is not one 
“between different ethical systems, but actually between 
data-processing systems.” (Harari 2018). While in the 
twentieth century liberal democracies benefited from their 
decentralised approach to decision-making—distributing 
information and power among many people proved to be 
more effective than concentrating them in one place—in the 
twenty-first century recent progress in Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) has turned this around by enabling intelligent systems 
to process large volumes of information centrally (Harari 
2018). According to Harari, this shift would suggest that 
democratic ideals, such as equality and liberty, are “more 
fragile than we believe” (Harari 2018). Thus, rather than 
being “self-evident” or “irreversible” (Harari 2018), these 
ideals may change subtly, in a way that we do not expect, 
and we do not want.
This article is concerned with the notion of “social regu-
lation”, by which we mean the activity of governing a soci-
ety, encouraging certain outcomes over others, steering the 
behaviour of a community. While this activity has tradition-
ally been performed by a complex of explicit and implicit 
rules, enacted by an authority, or elicited by social interac-
tions, we are interested in how modern AI technology inter-
acts with it.
The problem of effectively governing a country of hun-
dreds of millions of citizens has been debated in policy cir-
cles for a long time (Heaven 2017), and there are proposals 
to turn to digital technology (Larson 2018). In this article, 
we will use the expression “algorithmic regulation” to refer 
to the use of algorithmic methods for social regulation or 
governance.1
As we debate new ways to apply intelligent technologies 
to governance, we cannot ignore that modern web com-
panies manage numbers of users larger than that of most 
countries (Constine 2017), nor can we ignore the problems 
posed by the deployment of AI in restricted domains such as 
personalised news delivery and enforcement decisions (e.g. 
Mittelstadt et al. 2016; Burr et al. 2018, Scantamburlo et al. 
2019). What could be the effect of deploying AI systems at 
the centre of a growing infrastructure of linked-data for gov-
ernance of a whole society? To answer this question, we take 
seriously the proposal made by Tim O’Reilly for algorithmic 
 * Nello Cristianini 
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1 Other definitions have been proposed by Yeung (2017) and Hilde-
brandt (2018). Our discussion connects also to Gillespie (2017), but 
it extends beyond the problem of how social media platforms curate 
contents and police the activity of their users by algorithms.
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regulation of society, examine its risks, and its relation to 
experiments currently under way in different countries and 
the private sector.
In 2013, the Silicon Valley investor, publisher, and futur-
ist Tim O’Reilly proposed that society can be more effec-
tively regulated by using feedback loops, rather than top-
down law enforcement. His example was the way in which 
ride-sharing apps like Uber can regulate the behaviour of 
both drivers and passengers, both by leveraging a range of 
sensor data and by maintaining a reputation management 
system, instead of using top-down rules and inspection 
(O’Reilly 2013). O’Reilly also drew general conclusions 
for social governance, suggesting that data sources, com-
bined with a reputation management system can do a better 
job than any amount of government regulation (O’Reilly 
2013:293). Taxis can “increase their availability even in 
less frequented locations” and, more importantly, by asking 
passengers to rate their drivers, the quality of services can 
improve automatically: “drivers who provide poor service 
are eliminated” (O’Reilly 2013, 293). The central elements 
indicated by O’Reilly for his notion of algorithmic regula-
tion are: clear outcomes, real-time measurements indicating 
whether those outcomes have been achieved, and adjust-
ments of the rules based on such measurements (O’Reilly 
2013, 290). Of course, these are also the central require-
ments of feedback-control systems in engineering, as will 
be discussed below.
Similar proposals have recently gained importance, 
since the government of China announced the creation of a 
national scoring system for its citizens that can ultimately be 
used to administer positive and negative incentives, either in 
the form of these citizens being added to or removed from 
certain lists, and in some cases in the form of points assigned 
to citizens based on their behaviour (Creemers 2018). Bad 
behaviours (also called “trust-breaking acts”), such as tax 
evasion or refusal to carry out statutory duties, contribute 
new entrants in a blacklist and this affects both individuals 
and organisations by imposing penalties and limiting access 
to government programmes, high-speed trains, hotels or pur-
chases, etc.2
While governments and public organisations are mov-
ing forward, the private sector went ahead with the employ-
ment of pervasive tracking and scoring mechanisms for the 
enforcement of desired behaviours. In this way, eBay allows 
buyers and sellers to rate one another to facilitate trading, 
health insurance companies3 use trackers and personalised 
incentives to help their customers “live longer” (Sullivan 
2018), and many apps for housekeeping activities, like 
Handy, work in a Uber-style fashion to offer efficient and 
affordable services (Ticona et al. 2018). Likewise, Ama-
zon fulfilment centres constantly monitor and analyse their 
employees to meet certain performance standards (Bernton 
and Kelleher 2012) and, as we recently discovered, Face-
book scores its users’ trustworthiness when they flag a post 
as fake (Dwoskin 2018).
China’s social credit score represents a paradigmatic 
example, but parts of the anatomy of the Chinese system—
individual ID, linked data, automated interventions—
(Creemers 2018) are in place, or under way, also in other 
countries such as Singapore and Estonia. In most of these 
attempts there are plans to integrate services which may 
involve citizens, associations or business activities, from vot-
ing to education, taxes and justice, in one single infrastruc-
ture that can run processes by itself (filing taxes, reviewing 
medical records, checking eligibility for voting, etc.) and 
influence collective behaviour.4
To analyse the main technical and sociological under-
pinnings of O’Reilly’s proposal, we will review the various 
components that would be needed to implement that type 
of algorithmic regulation of a society, and how these com-
ponents are being used at the moment. In doing so, we will 
introduce a unified framework that builds upon the notions 
of social machines and autonomous agents and provides the 
technical grounds for the philosophical discussion.
In this article, motivated by O’Reilly’s intuition, we relate 
the notion of algorithmic regulation to the use of digital 
systems to monitor citizens and give them automatic and 
personalised incentives with the purpose of influencing 
their behaviour. The question we want to pose concerns 
the implications of using algorithmic regulation technolo-
gies to govern a society. Our analysis suggests three main 
classes of problematic consequences (technical, ethical and 
political) which help us separate risks that would result from 
an imperfect realisation of the AI system, from those that 
2 As well as Creemers (2018) see also the following document: 
“State Council Guiding Opinions concerning Establishing and Per-
fecting Incentives for Promise-keeping and Joint Punishment Systems 
for Trust-Breaking, and Accelerating the Construction of Social Sin-
cerity”. State Council. 30th May 2016. Available online: https ://china 
copyr ighta ndmed ia.wordp ress.com/2016/05/30/state -counc il-guidi 
ng-opini ons-conce rning -estab lishi ng-and-perfe cting -incen tives -for-
promi se-keepi ng-and-joint -punis hment -syste ms-for-trust -break ing-
and-accel erati ng-the-const ructi on-of-socia l-since r/.
3 For example, Vitality programme (https ://www.vital itygr oup.
com/) provides customers with a smartphone app to set up person-
alised goals, carry out and monitor activities (e.g., buying healthy 
food, doing physical exercise, spinning wheel, etc.). The application 
includes the use of personal data, gamified elements and scoring 
mechanism (Sullivan 2018).
4 For example, albeit different, both China’s Social Credit Score and 
Estonia’s e-government aim at promoting certain behaviours within 
society. So, the Chinese ambition is to stimulate sincerity and trust 
(Creemers 2018), while the Estonia’s goal is to foster transparency 
and “to make it impossible to do bad things” (Keen 2016).
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would result from the concept itself of algorithmic control 
of society.
To summarise our main findings: social machines are a 
stable technology that is currently used, among other things, 
to create reputation management systems; the principles and 
details of their design are extremely important for consid-
erations relative to user autonomy (mechanism design and 
crowdsourcing being parts of the discussion); once created, 
these machines can act as autonomous agents, and act in a 
way to maximise their utility (whose alignment with col-
lective utility or the intended goals of the designer should 
not be taken for granted) generating important technical and 
social challenges relative to their stability, alignment, trans-
parency and fairness. Feedback loops and control are other 
key features of such systems and may interfere with funda-
mental aspects of our society such as people’s autonomy, 
social order and the exercise of power.
This article is organised as follows. In Sect. 2, we will 
describe the notion of social machines, how they can be 
implemented and how they can be used to implement auton-
omous agents. In Sect. 3, we will describe reputation (man-
agement) systems, how they relate to social scoring and how 
they can be part of a regulatory feedback loop. In Sect. 4, we 
will put these two ideas together to describe how we already 
have social regulation via distributed reputation scoring, all 
mediated by a single algorithm, in limited domains. As these 
methods are currently used in the private sector, we briefly 
look at what can be learnt from that experience, before dis-
cussing current efforts to deploy them to regulate entire soci-
eties. In Sect. 5, we will discuss some considerations about 
the technical and social consequences of this proposed turn 
and summarise our findings in the conclusions.
2  Social machines as autonomous systems
The essence of algorithmic regulation proposals lies in 
the automatic delivery of positive and negative incentives 
(e.g. discounts or fines) to individuals for specific actions, 
behaviours or performance. These incentives are aimed at 
individuals, and therefore require ways to collect individual 
information, resulting either from measurements (e.g. time 
required to perform a delivery) or from social feedback, 
such as customer satisfaction rating, as proposed in O’Reilly 
(2013).
In this sense, their implementation would not be very dif-
ferent than for existing forms of personalisation (e.g. person-
alised recommendations or ads, or credit scores), and would 
typically require a way to identify individuals, and gather 
and store individual information, including some sort of a 
score. The citizens would be expected to adjust their behav-
iour in a way to improve their score, if it is linked to benefits, 
opportunities, or even just social recognition.
While some of the required individual information would 
be directly observed and measured (geolocation data, pay-
ments, etc.), a part of it would be the product of human 
judgment (as in the car-sharing example). In order to under-
stand the functioning of this class of systems (i.e. reputation 
systems) that bring together algorithms and humans we will 
employ the more general notion of social machines.
2.1  Social machines
A machine is a system, or apparatus, formed by several parts, 
each with a definite function, which interact together in a 
specific way, so as to perform a particular task. There is 
no limitation to the technical substrate of these parts, they 
can include hydraulic, electric, or mechanical parts, among 
others. A social machine is a special type of machine where 
some of the components, performing some subtask, are 
formed by humans (whom we call participants).
The moving assembly line is an example of a social 
machine. An assembly line is formed by a set of worksta-
tions where the same operations are always performed in 
a consistent way, and various parts are added to a product, 
as it moves through the line. Some of the operations are 
performed by machines, and others by people, in a highly 
coordinated and systematic fashion. So long as all the opera-
tions are performed in the same time and way, it does not 
matter who performs them. Human participants are typically 
used for operations that cannot be easily automated, but act 
in a very structured manner, and do not control the overall 
process. They are in fact parts of a machine and do not need 
to be aware of the overall results of their actions in order to 
do their job.
A bureaucracy is another, classic form of social machine.5 
For example, take a national post office, a bank or an airline, 
they all share a set of structural characteristics: functions 
and roles reflect a hierarchy, tasks are divided among work-
ers and performed routinely, the input and the output of the 
tasks are standardised, the workflow and the coordination 
among the workers are specified by rules and communica-
tions are performed via structured forms. Even though many 
tasks are performed by humans, each participant has limited 
autonomy and is not in the position to determine the behav-
iour of the overall machine, maybe not even be aware of it.
Drawing on a rich literature (see Berners-Lee and Fis-
chetti 1999; Smart and Shadbolt 2014) we define a social 
5 Max Weber (1978) was the first to acknowledge this and considered 
bureaucracy as the most effective form of organisation: “The deci-
sive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always 
been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organiza-
tion. The fully developed bureaucratic apparatus compares with other 
organizations exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical 
modes of production” (Weber 1978, 973).
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machine as a machine where human participants and techni-
cal artefacts (e.g. a car, a piece of software, a robot) interact 
with one another to perform a task that would be hardly 
achievable by any single part.6 Mechanisms incorporating 
‘participants’ extend across domains and include: assem-
bly lines, bureaucracies, auctions, markets, voting schemes, 
product delivery services, games, peer production, crowd-
sourcing, etc.
Even though social machines have existed for a long 
time, they have been formalised only recently in the con-
text of web technologies (Berners-Lee and Fischetti 1999) 
and include various ways in which communities are organ-
ised by a web-based infrastructure.7 Online crowdsourcing 
services, such as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, operate as 
modern assembly lines, where each participant performs a 
well specified task, that might be difficult to automate, and 
does not need to know the overall goals of the machine. For 
example, participants can be asked to tag faces in photos by 
gender, to annotate images or articles, to type handwritten 
words, to answer questions and so forth.
Participants in crowdsourcing not only might not know 
the purpose of the machine, they might not even know its 
boundaries, i.e. what else is part of it. In other words, they 
are not in a position to control the machine’s overall behav-
iour. The use of web infrastructures to coordinate the behav-
iour of participants has proven to be a very effective way to 
organise social machines that may reach sizes of millions 
of participants.
A distinct example of web-based social machine is Wiki-
pedia, where participants do not execute instructions, but are 
regulated by tight rules,8 and interact via a common software 
infrastructure to generate and maintain an encyclopaedia. 
News curation communities such as Reddit and Digg work 
in similar ways, centred around shared social practices and 
software infrastructures.
Yet a different example of social machines is given by 
the cases where humans do not need to be aware, they are 
participating. YouTube users generate high quality informa-
tion about videos simply as a by-product of using the service 
(Covington et al. 2016). Similarly, eBay users participate in 
a very advanced mechanism to establish the price of goods, 
just by bidding for products.
The examples above show that there can be two funda-
mentally different ways to design a social machine, and we 
will call them ‘design principles.’
In one case, participants are directly instructed to perform 
tasks chosen by others and rewarded for that. This covers 
the assembly line, the bureaucracy, and in the case of online 
social machines, might cover cases like employment of 
Mechanical Turk workers to join a more complex machine.
The other case is where humans choose to participate in 
an activity, e.g. editing Wikipedia, ranking items, watch-
ing a video, and, as the unintended result of their acts, the 
machine as a whole performs a task. Note that, in this case, 
the participants might not need to be willing or aware to be 
part of a mechanism. For example, von Ahn and Dabbish 
(2004) found that in 1 month 5000 people can provide high-
quality annotation for more than 400,000,000 images just by 
playing a carefully designed sort of guessing game, called 
the ‘ESP game’.9 In general, the same mechanism is at work 
in gamified crowdsourcing apps, like FoldIt,10 where people 
perform some complex or costly tasks without realising they 
are doing so.
In the first class, social machines are designed according 
to a top–down approach. Participants receive instructions 
specified by a designer and execute them. In the second 
class, social machines are designed according to a bottom-
up approach. Participants voluntarily pursue their personal 
goals, but their individual actions and interactions are con-
strained in such a way that the resulting (i.e. emergent) col-
lective behaviour turns out to be pursuing the goals of the 
9 The ESP game consists of two players who are remotely looking 
at the same image and are rewarded for guessing which words the 
other use to describe it. Since they are randomly paired and unable 
to contact each other, it becomes a mind-reading game, hence it was 
called ESP (extra sensory perception) game (von Ahn and Dabbish 
2004). The optimal strategy for each player was to enter the label that 
is most appropriate for the label within a certain amount of time. In a 
4-month experiment, van Ahn and Dabbish (2004) suggested that the 
ESP game could be used to tag all Google Images. In 2006, Google 
got the license to develop its own version of the game (Google Image 
Labeller).
10 FoldIt (https ://fold.it/porta l/) is an online puzzle video game 
launched in 2008 by the University of Washington. By playing the 
game thousand users helped researchers to discover some protein 
configurations.
6 Note that the concept of “social machine” relates to many popular 
abstractions such as “collective intelligence”, “distributed cognition”, 
“wisdom of crowds”, “social computing”, and “social computation”. 
Also, the notion of social machines relates to that of socio-technical 
system as both encompass human and technical elements (for more 
details see the conceptualisation of socio-technical systems in Ver-
maas et al. 2011).
7 Note that when referred to web infrastructures, the notion of social 
machine incorporates that of online platform developed in media 
studies: “an online platform should be understood as a programmable 
digital architecture designed to organize interactions between users—
not just end users but also corporate entities and public bodies” (Van 
Dijck and de Waal 2018).
8 There are specific guidelines for creating content (e.g., editors 
should write in a neutral way, avoiding, understatement/overstate-
ment, and self-published sources, etc.), for reviewing articles (e.g., 
good article should meet certain standards, such as verifiability and 
broad coverage), or for solving disputes (e.g., editors can create a 
‘talk page’ to discuss changes or controversial contents and request 
a third-party opinion where necessary). For a full list see: https ://
en.wikip edia.org/wiki/Wikip edia:List_of_polic ies_and_guide lines 
#Conte nt_polic ies.
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overall machine. Ant colonies complete complex tasks with-
out any of the ants being aware of that or being in control. 
Markets, auctions, online recommender and e-commerce 
systems, might be in a similar league.
In the top-down approach, the instructions might be spec-
ified in a high-level programme11 and dispatched to the oper-
ating components possibly by means of a social compiler,12 
a layer of the machinery that would break the programme 
into elementary operations and assign them to the parts (i.e. 
human participants and machines).
In the bottom-up approach, the system is best described 
in terms of mechanism design, i.e. as an emergent behaviour 
resulting from the interaction of multiple rational agents. 
When this happens, both participants and the whole machine 
are specified in terms of the goals they pursue rather than the 
instructions they need to follow. Technically speaking, they 
behave like autonomous agents.
2.2  Autonomous social machines
A system is said to be autonomous when it acts under its 
own control, and a special class of autonomous systems are 
“goal-driven” or “rational” agents, which pursue goals13 
specified by a utility function which they try to maximise.14
Autonomous agents can use information gathered from 
the environment to make their own decisions and control 
some aspect of their environment. They can be adaptive 
(capable of learning) and perform types of inference (capa-
ble of reasoning). We often use the language of belief, pref-
erences and utility to describe them, but this is for conveni-
ence and not necessity (see Russell and Norvig 2010 and 
Burr et al. 2018).
Biological organisms or even species can be described 
as autonomous goal-driven agents (maximising number 
of offspring), as well as engineered control-systems (e.g. 
a thermostat pursuing homeostasis), but also economic 
agents (e.g. maximising profit). But not all systems can be 
described in this way.15 For example, typical assembly lines 
would not be an autonomous system, as they would not be 
able to react to changes in the environment without new 
instructions coming from outside. Wikipedia might be a 
kind of hybrid case since, while editors are driven by some 
private interests, their individual and collective behaviour 
is influenced by a series of guidelines and norms which are 
continuously revised and debated by the participants of the 
community (i.e. they are not elicited by the system’s utility 
function).
Social machines can be used to implement autonomous 
goal-driven agents, even if human participants are not aware 
of that. In this case, the participants should not be able to 
determine the behaviour of the whole system—otherwise the 
system would not be autonomous. We call them autonomous 
social machines (hereafter, ASMs).
Examples of ASMs can readily be found over the Internet. 
They include the recommendation systems behind YouTube 
or Amazon, which could never perform their function if it 
was not for the structured activity of their users—which 
act as (unaware) participants while make use of the system 
for their own purposes. Indeed, those systems were created 
when certain products or users did not exist, yet they can 
autonomously process them appropriately, as they learn 
and generalise. Common users’ actions (purchasing, filling 
a wish list, reviewing or searching items, rating a transac-
tion, flagging a comment, etc.) translate into information and 
ultimately into recommendations (Ricci et al. 2011).
The behaviour of an ASM is not dictated externally by 
any of its participants, nor is it pre-determined by its origi-
nal designers: it is instead the emergent result of its inter-
actions. So long as the human participants perform local 
tasks without controlling the system, the resulting social 
machine can be considered autonomous. While the goal of 
most recommender and marketplace systems is to increase 
either click-through rates or sales or profits (generally called 
interactions, or engagements, see Burr et al. 2018), none of 
the human participants has the same goals. An important 
point is that social machines can not only be autonomous 
but also—as demonstrated by the ESP game discussed ear-
lier—can be goal-driven, in the sense that their emergent 
behaviour has the net effect of increasing a certain utility. 
11 Programming languages to specify and coordinate crowdsourcing 
workers already exist. An example is AutoMan, a “crowd-program-
ming system” based on Scala which allows the programmer to man-
age some parameters (scheduling, budgeting and quality control) and 
to abstract the details of the tasks “so that human computation can 
be as easy to invoke as a conventional function” (Barowy et al. 2012, 
641).
12 A proposal to build “crowdsourcing compiler” has been put for-
ward by Chen et al. (2016). The crowdsource compiler would decide 
“which components of the task are best carried out by machine and 
which by human volunteers; whether the human volunteers should 
be incentivized by payment, recognition, or entertainment; how their 
contributions should be combined to solve the overall task; and so 
on” (Chen et al. 2016, 106).
13 Since autonomous agents are directed towards the attainment 
of some purpose (“telos” in ancient Greek), their behaviour might 
be called “teleological” and has been widely studied in Cybernetics 
(Wiener 1948) and Artificial Intelligence (Russell and Norvig 2010).
14 In economics, the notion of ‘utility’ is a metrics representing a 
user’s satisfaction derived from picking one among possible options 
(e.g., in a recommender system, options might be books or videos). 
We represent a user’s ordering preferences over a set of alternatives 
by using a utility function.
15 In this article we assume that all agents can be regarded as sys-
tems, and occasionally we use ‘autonomous systems’ to indicate 
‘autonomous agents’.
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The goal of the overall system differs from the individual 
goals of its participants.
In the design of goal-driven social machines, a crucial 
problem is to link effectively participant’s utility with that 
of the whole system in a way that the pursuit of the former 
maximises the latter. To solicit the desired behaviour from 
participants, the designer might need to devise a series of 
incentives which may be positive (monetary rewards, points, 
forms of social recognition, etc.) or negative (fines, exclu-
sion from participation, etc.). In so doing the designer will 
develop specific mechanisms which will try to influence 
participants’ behaviour so as to make them act in a way that 
maximises the utility of the whole system.16
The study and the implementation of incentive schemes 
constitutes the main subject of mechanism design, a branch 
of game theory with broad applications in markets, auc-
tions, voting procedures, etc. (see Börgers 2015). Note that 
mechanism design is perfectly suited to O’Reilly request for 
clear outcomes—“the secret”, he says, “is to identify key 
outcomes that we care about as a society” (O’Reilly 2013, 
293)—since it works backwards, i.e. it sets up goals before 
choosing the rules of the game. In this way, it is possible to 
solve “a centralized problem in an informationally decentral-
ized system” (Naghizadeh and Liu 2016).
While (automated) incentive mechanisms are not neces-
sary for the regulation of a social machine—e.g. assembly 
line workers compliance with the rules can well be enforced 
via traditional systems—their employment can make a dif-
ference in the development of algorithmic regulation. Not 
only they may create those conditions which promote com-
pliance and facilitate implementation, as pointed out by 
O’Reilly, but can also shift the locus of power and control 
of the system to the locus of the reward function, as well as 
giving rise to issues that will be discussed later (see Sect. 5), 
such as value alignment. But before exploring potential 
problems, we examine how an ASM can make adjustments 
based on the information produced by the participants and 
activate mechanisms of feedback-loop.
3  Reputation system and credit scoring
The systems being proposed by O’Reilly to replace current 
governance methods are based on the (control-theoretic) 
notion of a feedback loop, so that individual actions or 
behaviours directly result into personal incentives. This is 
implemented by the intermediation of an infrastructure that 
keeps track of each participant, information relative to them, 
and their score (similar infrastructures are commonplace 
in the domains of customer relationship management and 
human resources management systems).
The fundamental technology required for this kind of 
social regulation is akin to that of a reputation system, a 
social machine evolved in online communities to process 
trust, combined with a more modern version of credit scores. 
It is also related to performance management systems such 
as those used in warehouses of online shops, e.g. such as 
Amazon. If combined together, these quantities can form 
a score which functions as an incentive-system to foster a 
desired behaviour (e.g. trustworthiness or productiveness).
Reputation Systems arose in the context of web com-
munities for promoting trust and good conduct among the 
group’s members (Jøsang et al. 2005). They allowed users 
to rate each other after completing a transaction and aggre-
gate these ratings to produce a reputation score (Jøsang et al. 
2005). This enables a notion of trust in online environments 
where users have limited information about products and 
other users. Note that rating can work in slightly different 
ways: while quality ratings allow users to assess things like 
movies and restaurants, reputation rating allows members of 
a community to rate each other. For example, in TripAdvisor 
users rate hotels and restaurants, in IMDB they rate movies, 
in Yelp they review local businesses, etc. In eBay, Uber and 
AirBnB, however, users rate each other and, in so doing, 
they provide information about members’ trustworthiness. 
In so doing, reputation systems offer an implementation of 
those social fictions that Harari describes as essential for the 
functioning of a large society (Harari 2014).
Note that rating mechanisms can be included also in 
recommender systems.17 However, the scoring mechanism 
plays a different role in recommendation and reputation. 
While in the former case the score is used to estimate the 
preferences of users, in the latter case it is used to enforce 
some standard, i.e. avoid bad service providers18 and, for 
this reason, is said to function as a form of “collaborative 
sanctioning” (Jøsang et al. 2005), a feature well encapsu-
lated in O’Reilly’s proposal. In other words, if we consider 
16 Note that similar mechanisms have been widely studied in nudging 
theories, where a typical problem is how to influence agents’ behav-
iour by intervening on the presentation of available options (Thaler 
and Sunstein 2008). For a discussion of nudging in the context of AI 
see Burr et al. (2018).
17 Recommender systems that incorporate rating mechanisms could 
be based on collaborative filtering, a technique that makes predictions 
of user’s preferences based on similarity measures among users.
18 In comparing Collaborative filtering systems with Reputation sys-
tems, Jøsang et al. (2005) observed that while collaborative filtering 
selects rating based on similarities among users (the premise is that 
users with similar tastes will prefer similar products), a reputation 
system assumes that all members should judge the quality of a service 
or product because the aim is “to sanction poor service” (Jøsang et al. 
2005: 624). This connects to another important distinction: collabora-
tive filtering assumes that all members are trustworthy, whereas repu-
tation systems suppose that some users will try to deceive for increas-
ing their personal benefits (Jøsang et al. 2005: 625).
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transactions occurring between a supplier and a consumer, 
the same mechanism can be deployed either for the purpose 
of enabling consumers to make a more rational choice, or for 
encouraging suppliers to adopt a given behaviour.
Moreover, reputation systems can incorporate various 
mechanisms to avoid malicious attacks from unauthorised 
users, but also spamming, bias and distortion. Indeed, a rep-
utation system may face the problem of participants looking 
for shortcuts or tricks which maximise their utility but do 
not align with the utility of the system. For example, a user 
may want to inflate others’ perception about itself (e.g. to 
increase visibility) or not to report truthful information about 
others (Naghizadeh and Liu 2016), or an Uber driver might 
want to refuse a short ride, in the name of his/her conveni-
ence but against the interest of the passengers. Some of the 
reputation management systems have by now become an 
essential part of establishing trust in large online communi-
ties, acting as a sort of immune system to reduce the risk of 
various types of undesirable behaviour.
While reputation systems produce a score that reflects the 
subjective judgments of a group of individuals about another 
individual, product or businesses, other social machines can 
output a score that results from objective measurements of 
participants’ actions. This may involve monitoring activi-
ties by means of sensors, cameras, smartphones, or more 
sophisticated tools,19 and generate a score that may capture 
relevant information about a worker’s performance, such as 
productivity or engagement.20
In general, scoring systems could be derived from com-
bining various signals: reputation, objective performance 
criteria and other attributes (e.g. demographics). In some 
cases, a social machine can combine multiple sources, such 
as reputation and performance metrics. For example, sev-
eral on-demand apps, like Uber, Lyft or TaskRabbit employ 
both social feedbacks and work performance metrics, such 
as acceptance/cancellation rates and the number of tasks 
carried out, and both can contribute to derive penalties and 
rewards.21
In many countries a well-known example of scoring 
mechanism is a credit score. This is a number intended to 
represent the risk of lending money to a particular individ-
ual. Credit scores were first introduced by FICO22 decades 
ago in the United States, but from 1989 there has been a 
general-purpose FICO score used by credit card companies 
and banks, and other companies exist that provide similar 
services (we discuss how credit scoring regulate consumers’ 
behaviour in Sect. 4.3). Scores are based on data coming 
from consumer-credit files provided by “credit bureaus”, 
which may include: payment history (35% of the total 
score, reflecting how fast you pay your bills, bankruptcies); 
amounts owed, credit utilisation (30% of the total, reflecting 
how much you have borrowed out of your total allowance); 
length of credit history (15%), etc.
The effects of scoring systems, such as credit score and 
reputation systems, depend on the way they are used. If they 
determine how easy it is for users to receive a service (such 
as a loan, or a car ride), then any change in these scores 
directly affects the expected utility of users and so their 
existence is likely to influence user behaviour. In the socio-
logical literature the same effect is called “reactivity”: social 
measures, such as risk score or performance indicators, are 
called “reactive” because they “elicit responses from people 
who intervene in the objects they measure” (Espeland and 
Sauder 2007, 2). For example, schools and universities have 
made relevant changes in reaction to being ranked. So, they 
have changed the way in which they select students, allocate 
resources and organise work in order to optimise their rank 
(Espeland and Sauder 2007).
Likewise, the design of reputation mechanisms has direct 
consequences for the people being scored. For example, an 
Uber driver with a bad or poor reputation might be sus-
pended from work and, as a consequence of this, be encour-
aged to improve his or her service. Reputation score has 
a clear impact also in eBay: the average sales price of the 
same item can increase by 3% for top-rated sellers (Hui et al. 
2016) .
The basic idea of using scoring mechanisms in algo-
rithmic regulation is precisely to exploit reactivity to steer 
collective behaviour by using scores as incentives. This is 
where control theory meets social scoring.
19 Think of Amazon’s wristband which uses ultrasonic tracking and 
a haptic feedback system for controlling the worker’s hands. The 
wristband vibrates against the worker’s skin if the hand points to the 
wrong direction (Solon 2018).
20 The field dealing with the tracking of employee’s behaviour to 
extract information about their performance is also called “people 
analytics”. This include workplace technologies that analyse vari-
ous signals such as emails’ content, web-browsing patterns, list of 
apps opened and generate some score. For example, WorkSmart is 
a platform owned by Crossover (https ://www.cross over.com/works 
mart/#works mart-produ ctivi ty-tool) that takes photos of employees 
every 10  min, combines them with screenshots of their workstation 
and other data, and comes up with an “intensity score” (Solon 2017).
21 Penalties may include a temporary deactivation of worker’s profile 
and fees, see Ticona et al. (2018). In Handy, for example the service 
professional agreement states that: “In the event a Service Profes-
22 FICO, also known as Fair Isaac Corporation, is an analytics soft-
ware company based in California which was founded by William 
Fair and Earl Isaac in 1956. On FICO score and its components see 
also http://www.fico.com/25yea rs/.
sional’s aggregate rating falls below the applicable minimum rating, 
Handy reserves the right to deactivate the Service Professional’s 
access to the Handy Platform”. (https ://www.handy .com/pro_terms ).
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4  Social control and feedback loop: ASMs 
for algorithmic regulation
So far, we have seen that there exist mechanisms that can 
monitor the behaviour of an individual and compute a score 
that captures how aligned that behaviour is with a given 
value function. That score can increase and decrease in 
response to behaviour or performance, just like a credit 
score does, and it can include elements that are typical of 
reputation systems. Generally, these mechanisms can be 
based on social machines like those described above and be 
autonomous (i.e. an ASM), in the sense that various partici-
pants can provide the signals that inform that score—either 
directly or indirectly—but no individual can significantly 
affect or control the system’s outcome.
ASMs which embed scoring mechanisms offer a natural 
setting for O’Reilly’s proposal since they have a clear out-
come, real-time measurements and mechanisms of adjust-
ment (O’Reilly 2013, 290), i.e. all the elements listed as 
necessary for a feedback-control system. In practice, they 
are capable of observing the state or actions of an individual, 
computing how it aligns with their goals, and then admin-
istering positive or negative incentives. So, their behaviour 
can be studied from the perspective of Control Theory. In 
this case, of course, these systems are not just autonomous 
but also goal-driven.
4.1  Regulation by control systems
In its simplest form, a control system (the “controller”) 
regulates the behaviour of another system (the “plant”, or 
“controlled system”) by taking actions that (1) depend on 
the current state of the controlled system and (2) affect it. 
To do this, the controller needs to (a) observe the state of the 
controlled system, (b) compare it with the target state (the 
“set-point”), and (c) act on the controlled system to change 
its state. So, a controller must include sensors, actuators and 
a control algorithm. Clear goals (target state) and clear sens-
ing (current state) are necessary, and the difference between 
these two states is used as a control signal. When the con-
troller’s action depends on such a difference (e.g. the house 
temperature and the temperature set on the thermostat) the 
process is said to be a “closed loop control system”.
O’Reilly’s idea, of presenting citizens with incentives 
(rewards or punishments) that directly follow from their 
actions, aims at establishing a control loop—where citi-
zens are assumed to act rationally, and therefore adapt their 
behaviour to maximise their utility. Actuators in this case are 
replaced by the capability to act on the score of an individ-
ual, i.e. to administer incentives. An important requirement, 
of course, is that the controller has clear targets, can predict 
(probabilistically) the consequences of its actions and can 
read the actual state of the controlled system.
In general, the behaviour of individuals can be influ-
enced in various ways. There are forms of ‘soft’ control that 
increase the probability of an action being taken. Common 
methods may include nudging based on cognitive biases, 
or trading based on knowledge of economic incentives, and 
even extend to forms of coercion or deception (Burr et al. 
2018). A mechanism of this type, when applied to entire 
societies, can potentially steer their collective behaviour and 
offer alternative methods to law enforcement.
In reality, models of governance based on persuasive 
technologies already exist. Consider the problem of man-
aging traffic: limiting driving speeds can be achieved by a 
system of laws and fines, or by offering some rewards. For 
example, Enschede (Netherland) has invested 36 million 
euros to deploy an app that creates personal mobility profiles 
and rewards good behaviour like cycling or walking (Naafs 
2018). Similarly, a form of (negative) incentive is the sup-
plementary taxes which are added to the cost of unhealthy 
products (e.g. cigarettes or food and drinks with high level 
of fat) to discourage buyers and promote a healthier lifestyle.
In practice, however, the target-quantities observed by 
these regulatory systems may be replaced by proxies (or 
surrogates) that only partly align with the actual targets. For 
example, college and university rankings originated from the 
idea of publishing relevant indicators of the performance of 
higher education institutions, making them more account-
able to the public (Espeland and Sauder 2007). But, over the 
years, they came to be considered as (objective) measures of 
prestige and a goal to be pursued for its own sake. The com-
bination of multiple metrics, such as percentage of graduate 
students and the number of highly cited researchers, is in 
fact a construct that gives a limited understanding of what a 
university offers and, by the way, is the result of a computa-
tion performed by a social machine.
In sociology this effect relates to the problem of “com-
mensuration” (Espeland and Sauder 2007), i.e. the practice 
of translating qualities into quantities. In particular, Espe-
land and Sauder (2007) pointed out that mechanisms of com-
mensuration tend to change the focus of attention and sense 
making, i.e. “they reduce, simplify and integrate informa-
tion” (Espeland and Sauder 2007, 20).23 This mechanism 
has many important effects and a problematic one is the 
generation of unexpected and unintended reactions, which 
are often extraneous to the stated goal of the system—for 
example, universities started hiring “ranking managers” and 
23 For example, rankings “are meant to simplify complicated infor-
mation; they embody decisions that make vast amounts of other infor-
mation, often qualitative knowledge that is hard to assimilate to this 
form, irrelevant” (Espeland and Sauder 2007: 17).
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manipulating internal rules in order to increase their score 
(Espeland and Sauder 2007).
However, whatever the effect, in a control system it is 
pointless to distinguish between its intended and unintended 
consequences since, from a cybernetic point of view, “the 
purpose of a system is what it does” (Beer 2002). This slogan 
was introduced by cybernetician Stafford Beer to emphasise 
that the purposes of the designer are separated from the pur-
pose of the system, which might end up moving in a different 
direction. Beer said: “According to the cybernetician, the 
purpose of a system is what it does. This is a basic dictum. It 
stands for a bald fact, which makes a better starting point in 
seeking understanding than the familiar attributions of good 
intentions, prejudices about expectations, moral judgements, 
or sheer ignorance of circumstances” (Beer 2002).
Therefore, to understand the functioning of a control sys-
tem it is better to look at the observed effect rather than at 
the original intentions of the designer. If the system of credit 
scoring was initially designed to streamline bank decisions, 
but ended up changing consumer behaviour, then the credit 
score system has the effect (and therefore the purpose) of 
regulating consumer behaviour. In other words, the purpose 
of the system and that of its designer do not need to align. 
Likewise, even though university ranking systems were 
motivated by the need to increase accountability and support 
decisions of policy makers (e.g. how to distribute resources), 
ranked institutions adapted their behaviour to the incentives 
(delivered by the score) and generated a number of second-
order effects, which redefined the goal of the overall system 
(e.g. to promote standards of prestige and authority).
4.2  ASMs for social control
If we take O’Reilly’s proposal seriously, the key idea behind 
algorithmic regulation can take the form of an ASM with 
mechanisms of scoring for citizens and the resulting control 
loop. This would turn a society into a system where citizens 
are all automatically “enrolled” (not by opting into a private 
service, but as an essential part of their citizenship). The 
incentives that the system generates in terms of score would 
directly affect citizens’ utility and opportunities, and their 
behaviour would adapt accordingly. The central question 
posed in this article relates to the possible social implica-
tions of such a change .
This mechanism can be used in various ways and at dif-
ferent scales combining public and private resources, as 
O’Reilly suggests. For example, the city of San Francisco 
partnered with Yelp’s restaurant review platform to share 
health inspection data and “create a safer, healthier dining 
experience”.24 An example of one such system can be found 
in China, with the creation of a Social Credit System, but 
various other countries are active in the same space, with 
different projects.
China has been the first country to officially call for a 
unified system for social credit, where every single citizen 
is listed in a national database, and “social credit” informa-
tion is appended to it. Different variants of that concept have 
been tried, and we have to distinguish the national-level sys-
tem from various city-level experiments: the current propos-
als for the national system do not include a score, but rather 
the binary decision of adding a citizen to a black list or a red 
list on the basis of their behaviour, while certain city-level 
experiments (e.g. projects in Suining and Rongcheng), have 
explored the possibility of using actual scores and letter-
grades, as have done some private companies (Larson 2018; 
Creemers 2018).
The system resulted from an official policy decision of the 
Chinese leadership to use technology-driven tools for social 
control, as a supplement to traditional forms of governance 
(Creemers 2018). The idea originated in the context of finan-
cial credit—as a sort of Chinese version of FICO score—and 
expanded across domains to promote trust and honest con-
duct within society.25 The plan, officially outlined in 2014, 
includes a timetable for the realisation of a Social Credit 
System by 2020, including five steps: “creating a legal and 
regulatory framework for the SCS, building credit investi-
gation and oversight, fostering a flourishing market built on 
credit services, and completing incentive and punishment 
mechanisms”. (Creemers 2018, 12).
While the planning document does not refer to any scor-
ing methods, in the county of Suining a local project put the 
idea in practice. Citizens were given 1000 credit points at 
the start, then points could be deducted for infringements of 
certain norms, e.g. drunk driving convictions (50 points), 
having a child without family planning permission (35 
points), non-repayment of loans (30–50 points). Lost points 
could be recovered after a period of 2–5 years. On the basis 
of this score, citizens would be assigned to classes from A 
to D, and A-class citizens would have preferential access 
to employment opportunities, while lower-ranked citizens 
would face increased scrutiny in several areas, such as Party 
membership, enlistment in the military, loans, governmental 
support including basic social welfare (Creemers 2018). The 
24 Each year the health department inspects local restaurant and 
assign a score based on how they respect health code regulation. In 
this way, the initiative aims at improving food safety and restaurant’s 
25 See the document: State Council. Planning Outline for the Con-
struction of a Social Credit System (2014–2020). 14 June 2014. 
Available online: https ://china copyr ighta ndmed ia.wordp ress.
com/2014/06/14/plann ing-outli ne-for-theco nstru ction -of-a-socia 
l-credi t-syste m-2014-2020/.
attractiveness. See more here: https ://www.codef orame rica.org/featu 
red-stori es/san-franc isco-promo tes-its-resta urant -inspe ction -data-on-
yelp-to-impro ve-food-safet y.
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experiment, however, attracted criticism from state media, 
after which the A–D classification was dropped. A similar 
initiative, involving the assignment of a score and a rank-
ing system with related punishments and rewards (Mistre-
anu 2018), has been reported in Rongcheng and was listed 
among the main success stories for the propagation of social 
credit system.26
At present the Joint Punishment System is the main com-
ponent which has been developed at the nationwide level. 
The system identifies a series of undesired behaviours (the 
so-called “trust-breaking acts”), which contribute to the 
creation of a blacklist, and associated punishments. Exam-
ples of untrustworthy acts include: endangering the personal 
health and life security of the popular masses, tax evasion, 
malicious evasion of debt, sales of fake and shoddy products, 
false advertising, gathering a mob to bring social order into 
chaos, refusing to carry out statutory duties, or gravely influ-
encing the credibility of judicial bodies and administrative 
bodies, refusing to carry out national defence duties, refus-
ing or evading military service, etc.27
Once a citizen is flagged with the “blacklist status”, 
they can face restrictions in disparate fields: “They were 
barred from senior positions in SOEs, financial sectors […] 
They were no longer allowed to travel first class, on high-
speed trains, or on civil aircraft, to visit star-rated hotels or 
luxury restaurants, resorts, nightclubs and golf courses, to 
go on foreign holidays, to send their children to fee-paying 
schools, to purchase particular kinds of high-value insurance 
products, to buy or renovate their homes, or purchase cars.” 
(Creemers 2018, 15).
As Creemers (2018) suggests, key elements in the design 
of the SCS are (1) a system that ensures a unique, lifelong 
identifier for each citizen and a register number for corpora-
tions; (2) a massive data infrastructure to collect information 
about subjects from different sources (bank, local authori-
ties, social organisations, etc.); and (3) data mining tech-
nologies28 to process the stored information to sort people 
and provide pathways for action.
It is important to observe that similar components can 
be found in other national projects of smart governance. 
For example, Singapore’s project started a wide process 
of digitalisation since the eighties and recently moved to 
the next steps, integrating Internet of Things (IoT) and AI 
solutions. Its ambition is to provide “anticipatory services”, 
i.e. to solve issues before they are brought to the surface.29 
The project includes systems for detecting illegal parking, 
managing traffic and delivering services at key events of 
people’s life.30
In Europe, a model for smart governance is given by Esto-
nia (Jaffe 2016), where there are some analogies with the 
aforementioned cases: a unique identifier for each citizen 
linked to various repositories owned by private or public 
institutions (governments’ departments, hospitals, phar-
macies, schools, etc.), and tools for providing citizens and 
organisations with a vast array of services, from filing taxes, 
parking, buying tickets, to policing and voting (e-Govern-
ance Academy Foundation 2016).
A distinctive feature of Estonia’s project is that all data 
are not stored centrally, and a data exchange platform, 
X-Road, ensures secure communication among the various 
repositories. This reflects Estonia’s most inherent philosophy 
about data: information should not be entered twice—Esto-
nia’s Public Information Act does not allow organisations to 
establish separate databases to collect the same data (Vassil 
2016)—and individuals should be the owners of their data 
(e-Governance Academy Foundation 2016; Heller 2017). 
However, although the eGovernment ecosystem incorporates 
explicit legal principles for the protection of personal data, 
to the best of our knowledge, citizens’ right to authorise or 
deny access to personal data is limited to the health-care 
system (Priisalu and Ottis 2017)—e.g. does this apply also 
to education and business services?—and the possibility to 
opt-out of the ID card system is not allowed.31
The article (Priisalu and Ottis, p. 445) implies that per-
sonal data is accessible to government officers, the only pro-
tection being an automatic audit trail that makes it possible 
to log any access to personal data.
26 See the document “Notice concerning Issuing the Name List of the 
First Batch of Social Credit System Construction Demonstration Cit-
ies” of the National Development and reform Commission, and Peo-
ple’s Bank of China, cited in footnote n. 81 in Creemers (2018).
27 A more complete list can be found in document released by the 
State Council on 30th May 2016 (see note n. 1).
28 However, as Creemers (2018) pointed out, at present there are few 
evidences on the employment of algorithmic analysis, apart from 
credit scoring: “As far as public documents indicate, anyone’s social 
credit status will only be influenced by the history of their own con-
duct to the extent that it is covered through the SCS’s remit. Tech-
nological analysis is used, however, to make mass information more 
manageable, accessible or technologically presentable”. (Creemers 
2018, 22).
29 https ://www.zdnet .com/artic le/singa pore-unvei ls-plan-in-push-to-
becom e-smart -natio n/ but also see the report “Digital Government 
Blueprint” https ://www.tech.gov.sg/-/media /GovTe ch/Digit alTra 
nsfor matio n/Digit al-Gover nment -Bluep rint/dgb_bookl et_june2 018.
pdf?la=en.
30 For example, in 2018 a new app was launched for starting families. 
Thus, new parents could be automatically informed about birth reg-
istration, infant care and kindergarten admissions (see: https ://govin 
sider .asia/digit al-gov/singa pore-smart -natio n-e-payme nts-natio nal-
digit al-ident ity-antic ipato ry-servi ces/).
31 The ID card, which gives access to the services, are obligatory for 
all citizens, a rule that was approved in 2000 by the Estonian Parlia-
ment with the Identity Document Act (Vassil 2016).
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At present Estonia government does not include any scor-
ing or reputation mechanisms, but in the future the system 
may evolve into a next generation of e-services as a result of 
the persistent data collection activities. For example, the use 
of predictive analytics has been advocated32 in the context 
of disease prediction (e.g. type 2 diabetes).
Even though ASMs for nationwide social control do not 
exist in Europe, some argue that the seeds of a social scor-
ing are already present in European countries. For example, 
the psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer observed that in Germany 
there is a credit score, called “Schufa”, that assesses three-
quarter of Germans and five million companies. He observed 
that people who aim to rent a house or get a loan in Germany 
are required to provide their “Schufa rating” (the analogous 
of FICO score in US) and “factors like “geo-scoring” can 
also lower your overall grade if you happen to live in a low-
rent neighborhood, or even if a lot of your neighbors have 
bad credit ratings”. (quoted in Jahberg 2018).
4.3  Examples from the private sector
Despite the recommendations of Tim O’Reilly, the govern-
ance systems currently being developed by states do not 
match those used in the private sector, but it is worth keep-
ing an eye on that sector, to see what side-effects this man-
agement technology can have.
As we said an important area of application for algorith-
mic governance is credit scoring. The capability of regulat-
ing people’s behaviour is a direct consequence of the huge 
impact that a credit score has on people’s lives: a bad credit 
score can result in higher interest rates for a loan or, even 
worse, a denial of loan application. But the information 
determining a credit score (i.e. the credit report) may in part 
affect other important decisions, such as hiring and rent-
ing—credit checks can in fact be requested also by employ-
ers, landlords and utility companies.33 Of course, these 
effects translate into actions to be taken by the individual in 
order to avoid bad behaviours (e.g. delays in payments and 
losing income) that would negatively impact the score and 
create a bad credit reputation.
In the future we may expect that the influence of credit 
scores will expand beyond its original boundaries—for 
example some suggest their application in online dating34 
—and a sign of this might be the growing number of tech 
companies issuing credit scores. For example, firms like 
Sesame credit (an affiliate of Alibaba), Tencent, and Lenddo 
issue credit scores also by making use of online shopping 
habits, social media and networking activities. Some argued 
that this phenomenon might have disruptive effects on how 
credit scoring regulates social behaviour (Gapper 2018). So, 
while in traditional credit systems one improves its score 
by borrowing less and displaying self-control, social credit 
“tends to work in the opposite way—it gives users an incen-
tive to buy and rent items through platforms, and to build 
a circle of active and highly rated friends”. (Gapper 2018).
A key example of algorithmic regulation in the private 
sector is Uber, a digital platform that coordinates nearly two 
million drivers35 by means of an autonomous software agent. 
Rosenblatt (2018) summarises the situation of Uber drivers 
as working for an algorithm and says that: “the algorithmic 
manager seems to watch everything you do. Ride-hailing 
platforms track a variety of personalized statistics,36 includ-
ing ride acceptance rates, cancellation rates, hours spent 
logged into the app and trips completed”. She also adds that: 
“Uber uses the accelerometer in drivers’ phones along with 
GPS and gyroscope to give them safe-driving reports, track-
ing their performance in granular detail”. Rosenblatt (2018).
Notifications on performance and incentives are delivered 
on a regular basis to each driver. For example, Rosenblatt 
(2018) reports that drivers are shown selected statistics as 
motivating tools (e.g. “you are in the top 10% of partners”) 
and are informed on the areas in high demand.
The rating systems can also contribute to the deactivation 
of drivers: “In certain services on Uber’s platform, if drivers 
fall below 4.6 stars on a 5-star rating system, they may be 
“deactivated”—never fired. So, some drivers tolerate bad 
passenger behaviour rather than risking retaliatory reviews” 
(Rosenblatt 2018).
32 See the interview to Kristjan Vassil (University of Tartu) on the 
next generation of e-services, available online: https ://e-eston ia.com/
a-conve rsati on-with-krist jan-vassi l-on-the-next-gener ation -of-publi 
c-e-servi ces/ and the claims of the Chief Information  Officer Siim 
Sikkut quoted here: https ://www.polit ico.eu/artic le/test-drivi ng-the-
ultim ate-conne cted-socie ty-e-stoni a/.
33 For example, Experian, one of the main credit reporting agencies, 
declares that a job candidate may not be hired because of a bad credit 
report: and https ://www.exper ian.co.uk/consu mer/guide s/emplo yment 
.html The same may also happen for ranting as reported by Equifax 
(another popular credit rating agency): https ://www.equif ax.co.uk/
resou rces/loans _and_credi t/credi t_check s_for_renti ng.html.
34 For example, Denyer (2016) claimed there are some online dat-
ing platforms which encourage users to “display their Sesame Credit 
scores to attract potential partner”.
35 If we consider other Uber services, such as Uber eat, riders are 
75 million. See some facts and figures in Uber website: https ://www.
uber.com/en-GB/newsr oom/compa ny-info/.
36 The assessment of drivers combines a star rating system, cancel-
lation rate, acceptance rate and safety (e.g., through GPS tracking). 
Each of these can contribute to quality assessment, for example: 
“Cancellations create a poor rider experience and negatively affect 
other drivers”. See more on Uber Community Guidelines: https ://
www.uber.com/legal /commu nity-guide lines /us-en/.
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In 2015 an article in Forbes already described this situ-
ation based on a blog post37 of Silicon Valley CEO Peter 
Reinhardt. The article stresses that the main effect of labour 
platforms following a Uber-like model is that of “replac-
ing middle management with APIs” (Kosner 2015). This is 
described as a trend that will divide jobs into two categories, 
those below the API, managed by a software platform, and 
those above the API, in charge of making or controlling such 
platform (Kosner 2015).
The use of metrics and algorithms to manage a working 
environment has also been used in Amazon warehouses, as 
reported by the New York Times in 2015 (Kantor and Streit-
feld 2015). This article describes warehouses where workers 
are monitored by electronic systems to track performance, 
and office workers can report on each other’s performance 
through a tool called “Anytime Feedback”, which provides 
part of the metrics that rank workers—according to Kantor 
and Streitfeld (2015) the bottom of the ranking is eliminated 
periodically.
5  Discussion
The governance of increasingly large organisations or entire 
societies has so far relied on a set of methods and princi-
ples that evolved over the centuries, such as representative 
democracy and law enforcement. As we see various pro-
posals for the introduction of new technologies for social 
regulation, we should be clear that this turn would involve 
a transfer of power from current institutions to new ones, 
and that this transfer might not easily be reversible. There-
fore, a careful examination of positive and negative conse-
quences would be essential, as well as a transparent public 
debate including all parts involved, before—not after—any 
deployment.
The stated benefits of various forms of digital govern-
ance, with or without predictive analytics or incentive sys-
tems, have been mentioned above: increased transparency 
and efficiency (from the Estonian project), increased compli-
ance and morality (from the Chinese projects), faster adapta-
tion and control (from various commercial projects). Moreo-
ver, algorithmic regulation may offer greater flexibility and 
reduce the workload of regulators with saving of costs and 
time, i.e. it would allow to “govern least” (O’Reilly 2013).
In the subsections below, we focus on some possible 
consequences of adopting algorithmic regulation of soci-
ety, and at the end we also describe one possible way in 
which this might emerge without being explicitly adopted. 
Questions of various orders should be addressed as a matter 
of urgency, by different sectors of society and academia. 
These might regard issues of stability (How do we deal with 
undesirable dynamics, such as wealth concentration and low 
social mobility?), personal autonomy (How can we prevent 
an ASM from bypassing human deliberation?), value judg-
ments (To what extent could an ASM elicit change of hab-
its?), and power (Could an ASM redefine social ties and 
social norms?).
While we mention some of them below, we do not claim 
that we can cover all of them: this new area of technologi-
cal and social change does require urgent multidisciplinary 
attention. The purpose of this article is to pose the question 
of what implications this technology might have for society, 
multiple voices will be needed to address it. These questions 
aim to contribute a broader debate on the mediating role of 
technology in shaping human actions, interpretations and 
decisions, hence, human morality (see chapter 7 in van De 
Poel and Royakkers 2011).
The concerns of possible problematic consequences can 
be divided into three levels: technical, ethical and political. 
By this we mean to separate the risks created by an imperfect 
technical realisation of the project, from those created by the 
concept itself of algorithmic control of a society.
5.1  Technical level
While the engineering aspects of building an ASM can be 
solved by using infrastructures and technologies of the sort 
used today by online companies (e.g. Facebook) or banks, 
the emerging effects of connecting multiple interacting parts 
are not explored. Once everything is connected with every-
thing, higher order interactions can emerge—actually this 
can happen well before that moment. If the opportunity to 
have a job relates to online purchases or reading habits, for 
example, a new unexplored interaction is created. So, creat-
ing multiple separate feedback loops and scores might be 
safer and more stable than merging them and combining 
them into a general national scoring system. The experience 
of filter bubbles, public-opinion manipulations, market flash 
crashes, should be kept very much in mind.
As the individual scores both affect the behaviour of citi-
zens and are affected by it, there is the potential for feedback 
loops. If we also introduce reputation into the equation, then 
feedback loops can lead to stigmatisation and discrimination 
(positive feedback loops can amplify small differences). If 
we use social connections of a citizen as one of the sig-
nals to compute their social credit, we might automatically 
create the potential for stigmatisation of low-rank people, 
which would create a dynamics of rich-gets-richer and poor-
gets-poorer, or self-fulfilling prophecies: if people believe 
that they will be penalised by associating with low-scoring 
37 The blog post entitled “replacing middle management with an 
API” is available online: https ://rein.pk/repla cing-middl e-manag 
ement -with-apis.
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people, then they will adapt their behaviour—thereby reduc-
ing the opportunities of low-scoring people.
One should not exclude that similar dynamics might end 
up generating a power-law distribution, like those observed 
in the disproportionate distribution of wealth (Jha 2011). In 
a social scoring system a similar distribution would create 
an elite of people clustering around the first positions and 
the vast majority variously distributed on the rest, so that 
only a small portion of the population would account for the 
average score of a country’s citizens.
Social mobility would be a related issue, if negative feed-
back blocks people into the same rank with little chances of 
moving. The opposite can also be problematic, with exces-
sive volatility, due to positive feedback loops. Either way, the 
design of these systems might directly affect society struc-
ture and should not be taken lightly.
Instabilities might potentially also lead to flash-crashes, 
or inflation, as well as spontaneous growth in inequality. Just 
like filter bubbles and market flash-crashes, feedback effects 
should be expected here, and remedies should be planned 
ahead. What kind of dynamics can we expect? What lessons 
might be learnt from analogous complex interactions (e.g. 
algorithmic pricing) and applied to an ASM? What are the 
risks of instability?
The purpose of a goal-driven system is defined by its 
utility function,38 and the control system centred around the 
social score would be no exception: it would incentivise spe-
cific behaviours in the user and in society as a whole. The 
problem is that we typically can only measure the state of the 
controlled system (society) through proxies, that we assume 
to be well aligned with our actual goals. The quality of that 
approximation may change with time, as the controlled sys-
tem evolves, and over time we might have a system that is 
actively encouraging the pursuit of behaviours that do not 
align with the original goals. In that hypothetical scenario, 
citizens may have to follow behaviours that are actually sub-
optimal or negative, in order not to be disadvantaged.
Furthermore, if the reward function is itself relative to 
the rest of society (e.g. bonus is given to the top-10% in 
the group, or for moving towards the mean-behaviour in the 
community, etc.) then this can create not only competition, 
but also a drifting value function at the macro level. Rational 
citizens might then work against their own long-term good, 
locked into this behaviour by the automated system of 
incentives. In academia—to cite a familiar example to our 
readers—this has led many to prioritise publication num-
bers over quality, and ultimately to a multiplication of aca-
demic journals only justified by the spurious identification 
of publication rates with scientific productivity. In a similar 
scenario who will be in charge of changing the overall value 
function? What kind of safeguard measures do we need to 
avoid undesired drift, or worst, detrimental effects?
5.2  Cultural and ethical level
The idea of using feedback loops for the control of social 
systems is as old as cybernetics. Stafford Beer pioneered the 
use of cybernetics in management, introducing the notion 
of “total system” (Beer 1975), and the founder himself of 
the field, Norbert Wiener, devoted a book to the topic (Wie-
ner 1954). In legal scholarship, a similar view underlies the 
analysis of decentred regulation whose essential elements 
include, among other things, complexity, fragmentation of 
knowledge and the exercise of power, and interdependencies 
(Black 2002). Still, with his popular motto “the code is the 
law”, Lawrence Lessing suggested how the architecture of 
the Net (and its possible evolutions) can become a perfect 
tool of social control (Lessig 2006).39 So, what is proposed 
by O’Reilly, and is being explored in China and other coun-
tries, is not an innovation per se—the novelty is that we now 
have the technical means to gather individual information 
and administer individual incentives on a vast scale.
This article suggests that any system of social-level regu-
lation requires the creation of a powerful intermediator (or 
possibly more than one): the infrastructure that gathers and 
manages individual information, computes scores and incen-
tives, and organises the individual scores. Whoever sets the 
rules for that calculation has the power to steer the social 
group represented in the database. This observation, which 
is inherent to the design of an autonomous agent, suggests 
a possible cultural fallacy in the ideal of a decentred exer-
cise of power. Fragmentation of knowledge and distributed 
information processing might give the participants only the 
illusion of freedom since their choices would be continu-
ously coordinated and influenced by the controlling agent 
(i.e. the system-level utility function).
Even though the idea of self-regulation is fascinating 
because of its capability of harnessing diffused power and 
knowledge within society, the regulation operated by an 
ASM would be anything but neutral.40 The introduction of 
38 Note that we do not refer to the utility function of the designer, 
but the one actually emerging from the system, and revealed by its 
choices.
39 “The invisible hand of cyberspace is building an architecture that 
is quite the opposite of its architecture at its birth. This invisible hand, 
pushed by government and by commerce, is constructing an architec-
ture that will perfect control and make highly efficient regulation pos-
sible” (Lessig 2006: 19).
40 As Gillespie observed, the ability to orchestrate interaction among 
users is often contrasted by claims of impartiality made by the owners 
of media platforms: “from their earliest presentation they have often 
characterized themselves as open to all comers; in their promotion 
they often suggest that they merely facilitate public expression, that 
they are impartial and hands-off hosts, with an “information will be 
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intelligent machines at the centre of our society creates inter-
mediators with enormous privilege: they could behave as 
the best-informed player at each level of social interactions 
and the coordinator of all partial decisions (Wiener 1954).
The transition towards a non-neutral ASM regulating a 
group of people (be that an online community or a nation) 
creates a number of interrelated issues concerning human 
autonomy and freedom. These issues may arise from bypass-
ing participants in making decisions and taking various 
assumptions for granted in the design process. For exam-
ple, the idea of moving the regulation of domestic work into 
a platform like Handy or TaskRabbit, supposes that every 
participant agrees on various points (i.e. the rules of the 
game): e.g. that everyone has a device to access the service 
and knows how to use it; that customers’ ratings determine 
the salary of the taskers; that members communicate only 
by using the platform, and so forth.
In some cases, the implicit acceptance of the rules of the 
game as a precondition to opt-in might be not problematic 
(e.g. eBay or Airbnb) but in others decisions should be nego-
tiated with all members of the community. This is the case of 
services involving citizens and the possibility to coerce them 
by imposing conditions they might not share or agree with. 
For example, the decision of using a digital infrastructure 
to regulate the activity of a school would require a process 
of reflection and discussion at different levels (individual, 
family, the board of teachers, etc.) to enable everyone to 
express their own opinions and participate in the delibera-
tive process. In fact, a choice of that kind would not be just a 
technical change but also a policy decision premised on vari-
ous assumptions (e.g. do all families have access to digital 
devices? more importantly: do all agree on the educational 
values supporting certain functionalities?). One of the prob-
lems posed by an ASM regulating society is that it tends to 
obfuscate what decisions its participants are entitled to and 
what could be made without their involvement (i.e. without 
any infringement of citizens’ rights). So, fundamental ques-
tions for policy-makers, designers and scholars, are: What 
decisions and assumptions does the system take for granted? 
How may these impact the life of people? What decisions 
should be debated by all members of the community? And, 
more in general: In which ways could an ASM change demo-
cratic participation and social inclusion? Answering these 
questions involves a perspective of cooperative responsibil-
ity as an ASM results from the dynamic interaction of dif-
ferent types of actors (the participants, the owners of the 
platforms, etc.) and requires developing a process of public 
deliberation (Helberger et al. 2018).
An immediate dilemma emerging from this practice 
would be: Should the scores be public? Should they be 
shared with the individuals? Should the various metrics and 
formulae be public? Each answer would lead to different 
problems: complete transparency would create the risk of 
people ‘gaming’ the system, less than that would reduce 
people’s chances to calculate their best course of action.
Another set of problematic issues regards the internali-
sation of the quantities which may qualify participants in a 
social machine (e.g. their reputation or their performance). 
When we introduce a new intermediator to manage social 
regulation, we may internalise and socialise quantities such 
as our social score, effectively self-regulating us according 
to the rules of the system.
The application of numbers to qualify people’s life not 
only marks a departure from modern conceptions of human 
dignity,41 but also promotes a new form of moral exempla-
rity. The computation of scores has in fact the function of 
producing appropriate incentives and, with them, a desired 
change of (external) behaviour. But, as well as that, it may 
also involve a change of participants’ cognition (Espeland 
and Sauder 2007), i.e. how do they interpret and value those 
numbers. As participants assimilate connections between 
scores and benefits/penalties, they may internalise authori-
tative standards against which assess themselves and others. 
For example, connecting a credit score to the ability of find-
ing a partner invites people to value creditworthiness as a 
proxy of attractiveness, and making public high-rated users 
(e.g. eBay) or high-scored citizens (e.g. China) are effective 
ways to create role models and inspiring examples. Can we 
imagine a new class system based on these scores? How 
powerful would be whoever can affect that class system?
We should also note here that recent work (Burr and Cris-
tianini 2019) suggests that very personal information, such 
as beliefs, attitudes and aptitudes, can be inferred from the 
analysis of online behaviour, which poses new issues related 
to freedom of expression, as well as to privacy and fairness.
As an ASM expands its ability to implicitly convey val-
ues and norms, one might ask what the role of free will in 
participants’ reaction is, and to what extent their change of 
beliefs and values is in fact due to persuasive mechanisms 
(see also Burr et al. 2018) rather than intentional actions. 
The development of moral habits requires some degree of 
automatism—it is a common idea in both ancient and con-
temporary philosophers that habits requires repetition and 
routine movements (e.g. see Aristotle (2011) and William 
James (1891))—but this is not just a passive exercise. The 
Footnote 40 (continued)
free” ethos, and that being so is central to their mission” (Gillespie 
2017 p 4).
41 In Western culture moral principles and human rights rest on Kan-
tian conception of human dignity considered as “an intrinsic worth” 
that is distinguished from something that has a price and that can be 
exchanged for something else (Kant 1996).
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acquisition of habits needs also the faculty of judgment 
deliberating what are good and bad habits (see e.g. the role 
of practical rationality/wisdom in Aristotle (2011) or value 
judgments in Dewey (1981)). To what extent could an ASM 
elicit change of habits? How can participants exercise moral 
judgment in a social machine which tries to continually 
adjust their behaviour and has the potential to change their 
beliefs and values? How do we help participants pursue their 
goals in the respect of their freedom, autonomy and dignity?
5.3  Political and social level
Attention should also be paid to the political and social 
implications of this technology. One political concern that 
has been put forward, is that the emergence of a form of 
governance is strongly related to technological innovation, 
and intelligent systems may contribute to the creation of 
new authoritarian regimes (Harari 2018). In this scenario, 
the new face of dictatorship might not necessarily be that 
of an unpleasant, authoritarian ruler, but that of an efficient 
autonomous system which exploits the information produced 
by citizens with the aim of prescribing the behaviours that 
best maximise its specific goal (be that “trust”, “honesty”, 
“excellence”, “transparency”, “accountability”, etc.). Using 
the terminology of this article, we could consider that the 
next generation of dictators might look like an ASM, i.e. a 
teleological social machine that mediates every interaction 
and, thanks to the collected information, computes scores 
and delivers incentives to influence participants’ behaviour.
While the example of the Chinese system is not an auton-
omous social machines—as we said, the apparatus rests on 
a binary decision (not a score) and incentives are not gener-
ated automatically by an algorithm—the system proposed 
by O’Reilly would definitely be. The technical properties we 
surveyed in the previous sections, now invite us to reflect on 
their social impact.
As the deployment of social-regulation technologies 
is essentially an exercise in reforming the way we control 
society, it is at its core a problem of power. This should 
be analysed with the conceptual tools relative to power and 
institutions, which is too large a topic to be discussed here. 
However, we will discuss here a few basic considerations 
with respect to contemporary conceptualisations of power.
In social and political science, the notion of power refers 
to a form of control that is exercised on a group of people by 
some authority (a government, a monarch, a religious leader, 
a manager, etc.). Its exercise may involve the use of physi-
cal force, but modern societies have also developed non-
violent methods to control populations. These include a set 
of mechanisms based on scientific knowledge and technical 
innovations to manage effectively social organisations (cit-
ies, hospitals, schools, prisons, factories, etc.), an approach 
that Michel Foucault calls “biopower” (Foucault 2007). 
According to Foucault modern institutions, starting from 
the military system, have learnt such methods and developed 
common characteristics that we might find also in a social 
machine: hierarchical surveillance—spaces and hierarchies 
are designed in a way to make “people docile and know-
able” (Foucault 1991, 172)—mechanisms of gratification 
and punishment which correct and differentiate individuals 
(the so-called “normalizing judgments”42), and perpetual 
forms of examination which define the particular status of 
each individual.43
It would be interesting to analyse how ASMs fit within the 
general progression of methods of social control described 
by Foucault, and we leave this as an important open question 
(Foucault 1991).
More generally, future work should attempt to answer 
the following questions. What kind of society could be pro-
duced by ASM-induced social regulation? Which social 
norms would it reflect? Who would be responsible for their 
embedding into the system? How do we guarantee the plu-
ralism of values in a system that might tend to homogenise 
individuals?
In political philosophy, the framing of social bonds in 
purely utilitarian terms would connect to the notion of “pri-
vate society”, i.e. a group of individuals whose “motiva-
tional horizons do not extend beyond the people and projects 
that are the focus of their personal lives” (Waheed 2018). A 
society of this type tends to undermine the idea of common 
good44 because each individual would only care about those 
goods with a direct impact on their private life. Even in a 
context of an ASM, where incentives might be deployed 
for promoting a specific common good, say equal access 
to opportunities, some philosophers would argue that this 
42 “The art of punishing, in the regime of disciplinary power, is 
aimed neither at expiation, nor even precisely at repression. It brings 
five quite distinct operations into play: it refers individual actions to 
a whole that is at once a field of comparison, a space of differentia-
tion and the principle of a rule to be followed. It differentiates indi-
viduals from one another, in terms of the following overall rule: that 
the rule be made to function as a minimal threshold, as an average 
to be respected or as an optimum towards which one must move. ft 
measures in quantitative terms and hierarchies in terms of value the 
abilities, the level, the ’nature’ of individuals. It introduces, through 
this ‘value-giving’ measure, the constraint of a conformity that must 
be achieved. Lastly, it traces the limit that will define difference in 
relation to all other differences, the external frontier of the abnormal” 
(Foucault 1991,182).
43 Foucault took Bentham’s panopticon as the best representation of 
a complex of mechanisms governing a social body: “a generalizable 
model of functioning; a way of defining power relations in terms of 
the everyday life of men” (Foucault 1991, 205).
44 The notion of common good is controversial and different 
accounts exists. In this article we refer to the common good as the 
set of interests that all members of a community care about in virtue 
of their mutual relationships, such as civil liberties and public safety 
(Waheed 2018).
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would not be enough: even in that case individuals would 
act for the sake of some private benefit and fail to perceive a 
“relational obligation towards common affairs”45 (Waheed 
2018).
These intuitions suggest that a society implementing 
algorithmic regulation may risk to redefine social relations: 
individuals might be encouraged to establish strategic rela-
tionships (seek people that would increase social score and 
avoid those that would penalise it) according to the incen-
tives set up by the controlling agent. What would be the 
future of the common good in a society regulated by an 
ASM? How could an ASM contribute to protect common 
interests which would stand independently of individual 
agents’ interest (be that of the controlled or the controlling 
agent) and, potentially, in contrast to anyone of them?
6  Conclusions
The main purpose of this article is to pose a series of urgent 
questions, rather than answering them. Algorithmic regula-
tion of society in this moment is little more than a tempt-
ing idea in academic, policy and entrepreneurial circles, but 
many of its components already exist, and furthermore many 
recent developments suggest that there is political interest 
in some version of it, albeit by other names. While it might 
be unlikely that in Europe, we would see an explicit effort 
to fully deploy this kind of system, there is still a risk that 
this might emerge on its own, as a result of mergers and 
drifts of related systems, much like it seems to be happen-
ing with national DNA or ID systems or various forms of 
surveillance.
The risk of drifting into some version of algorithmic 
regulation of society is real. For example, it may start from 
a specific or local project, then grow by increasingly incor-
porating new capabilities (linkage of information, inference 
mechanism, classification systems, etc.). Maybe they could 
start as an opt-in system, but then by gravitational-pull end 
up being unavoidable, and de facto mandatory, as is today 
being online. The most likely starting points for this drift 
are either a national ID system, acting as a scaffold to con-
nect various sources of personal information, or a scoring 
system for specific categories (e.g. for certain professions) 
with the ability of growing to cover an increasingly large 
domain of society.
Any social platform where users interact will end up 
influencing their behaviour, and not in a neutral way. An 
instructive example of unintended drift—that would be 
familiar to the readers of this article—is that of ORCID 
numbers, initially introduced as a way to solve homonymy 
among researchers, which however nudge all members to 
accept various levels of service, linking their name to cita-
tion indices, and essentially nudging towards a scoring sys-
tem for academics. Since many journals demand that their 
authors have an ORCID number, there is a clear path to a 
hypothetical moment where all researchers would have to 
accept the scoring system chosen and therefore act accord-
ingly. Of course, there is nothing particularly sinister in aca-
demic scoring, this example is only intended to illustrate 
how drift can happen.
This simple consideration adds one more question to the 
list of problems that we encourage our colleagues to work 
on: that relative to the opting-out/opting-in dilemma, which 
keeps on emerging in different areas of digital ethics.
We call “gravitational pull” the problem posed by tech-
nologies (e.g. algorithmic regulation of society) when they 
exert a force that brings ever larger portions of people’s lives 
into them. As the system scales up, the cost of opting-out 
increases with the size (or coverage) of such a system. Not 
only is this used in viral marketing strategies, but this also 
creates a Nash equilibrium where everyone is part of the 
system: at that point there is a significant cost for each indi-
vidual to leave. Could a business today afford not being on 
the internet? Is it still meaningful to claim that people have 
freely opted into such a system?
In the case of social scoring, imagine a situation where 
if a private entity takes the role of endorsing people, and 
gathers significant following, such that citizens are at a dis-
advantage by not opting-in, what obligations does that busi-
ness have? Are these the obligations that currently apply to 
(financial) credit scoring systems? Would that private actor 
have the right to demote or expel (i.e. excommunicate) an 
individual? Of course, these issues become even more press-
ing if the endorsement is operated by a public institution.
As we said, the problem of “gravitational pull” relates to 
that of “opting-out”: what do you do when most other mem-
bers of your community agree to be scored, to quantify their 
level of trustworthiness? If you join, you accept the scoring 
rules and their consequences, as well as giving increased 
coverage to the system. If you do not join, you might be 
stigmatised, potentially losing access to opportunities.
This is just an example of the several dilemmas that 
emerge from the study of persuasive technologies and algo-
rithmic regulation, and they all—eventually—merge at the 
same place: the need to give a new, fresh and multidisci-
plinary look at the issue of autonomy and social ties, in the 
new situation where technology brings new challenges to 
that fragile concept. We hope that scholars in Ethics, Sociol-
ogy and Engineering will find a way to jointly address that 
question.
45 These relational obligations are analogous to those found in fam-
ily: parents are required not only to feed and clothe their children, 
they are also required to care about them (Waheed 2018), e.g., their 
education, their mental and physical health, their moral development, 
etc. Something analogous exists also for civic relations.
AI & SOCIETY 
1 3
Acknowledgements NC and TS were supported by the ERC Advanced 
Grant ThinkBIG.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Crea-
tive Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creat iveco 
mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribu-
tion, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate 
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the 
Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Aristotle (2011) Nicomachean ethics. In: Bartlett RC, Collins SD (eds) 
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Barowy DW, Curtsinger C, Berger ED, McGregor A (2012) AutoMan: 
a platform for integrating human-based and digital computation. 
SIGPLAN Nots 47(10):639–654. https ://doi.org/10.1145/23988 
57.23846 63
Beer S (1975) Platform for change. Wiley, Chichester
Beer S (2002) What is cybernetics? Kybernetes 31(2):209–219
Berners-Lee T, Fischetti M (1999) Weaving the web: the original 
design and ultimate destiny of the world wide web. Harper Col-
lins, New York
Bernton H, Kelleher S (2012) Amazon warehouse jobs push workers to 
physical limit. The Seattle Times. https ://www.seatt letim es.com/
busin ess/amazo n-wareh ouse-jobs-push-worke rs-to-physi cal-limit 
/. Accessed 16 May 2018
Black J (2002) Critical reflections on regulation. Aust J Legal Philos 
27:1–35
Börgers T (2015) An introduction to the theory of mechanism design. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford
Burr C, Cristianini N (2019) Can machines read our minds? Minds 
Mach. pp 1–34
Burr C, Cristianini N, Ladyman J (2018) An analysis and model of 
the interaction between intelligent software agents and human 
users. Mind Mach 28(4):735–774. https ://doi.org/10.1007/s1102 
3-018-9479-0
Chen Y, Ghosh A, Kearns M, Roughgarden T, Wortman Vaughan J 
(2016) Mathematical foundations for social computing. Commun 
ACM 59(12):102–108
Constine J (2017) Facebook now has 2 billion monthly users and 
responsibility. TechCrunch. https ://techc runch .com/2017/06/27/
faceb ook-2-billi on-users /. Accessed 1 Sep 2018
Covington P, Adams J, Sargin E (2016) Deep neural networks for 
youtube recommendations. In: Proceedings of the 10th ACM 
Conference on Recommender Systems, pp 191–198. https ://doi.
org/10.1145/29591 00.29591 90
Creemers R (2018) China’s social credit system: an evolving practice 
of control. SSRN Electron J. https ://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.31757 92
Denyer S (2016) China’s plan to organize its society relies on ‘big data’ 
to rate everyone. The Washington Post, Washington
Dewey J (1981) Theory of valuation. In: Boydston JA (ed) The later 
works. Illinois University Press, Carbondale, pp 1925–1953
Dwoskin E (2018) Facebook is rating the trustworthiness of its users on 
a scale from zero to 1. The Washington Post, Washington
e-Governance Academy Foundation (2016) e-Estonia: e-Governance 
in Practice, Report of the project “Norwegian-Estonian e-Gov-
ernment initiative”. https ://ega.ee/proje ct/norwe gian-eston ian-e-
gover nment -initi ative /. Accessed 12 Oct 2018
Espeland WN, Sauder M (2007) Rankings and reactivity: how public 
measures recreate social worlds. Am J Sociol 113(1):1–40
Foucault M (1991) Discipline and punish. The birth of prison, trans-
lated by Sheridan A. Penguin Books, London
Foucault M (2007) Security, territory, population: lectures at the Col-
lege de France, 1977–78 translated by Burchell G. Palgrave Mac-
Millan, London
Gapper J (2018) Alibaba’s social credit rating is a risky game, Finan-
cial Times. https ://www.ft.com/conte nt/99165 d7a-1646-11e8-
9376-4a639 0addb 44. Accessed 22 July 2018
Gillespie T (2017) Governance of and by algorithms. In: Burgess 
J, Marwick A, Poell T (eds) The SAGE handbook of social 
media paperback. SAGE Publications Ltd, Thousand Oaks, pp 
254–278
Harari YN (2014) Sapiens: a brief history of humankind. Harvill 
Secker, London
Harari YN (2018) Why technology favors tyranny. The Atlantic. https ://
www.theat lanti c.com/magaz ine/archi ve/2018/10/yuval -noah-harar 
i-techn ology -tyran ny/56833 0/. Accessed 1 Oct 2008
Heaven D (2017) The uncertain future of democracy. BBC features 
newsletter. http://www.bbc.com/futur e/story /20170 330-the-uncer 
tain-futur e-of-democ racy. Accessed 20 Sep 2018
Helberger N, Pierson J, Poell T (2018) Governing online platforms: 
from contested to cooperative responsibility. Inf Soc 34(1):1–14. 
https ://doi.org/10.1080/01972 243.2017.13919 13
Heller N (2017) Estonia, the digital republic. The New Yorker. https 
://www.newyo rker.com/magaz ine/2017/12/18/eston ia-the-digit 
al-repub lic. Accessed 10 Oct 2018
Hildebrandt M (2018) Algorithmic regulation and the rule of law. 
Philos Trans R Soc A 376:20170355
Jaffe E (2016) How Estonia became a model for e-government. 
Medium. https ://mediu m.com/sidew alk-talk/how-eston ia-becam 
e-a-globa l-model -for-e-gover nment -c12e5 002d8 18. Accessed 20 
Aug 2018
Jahberg H (2018) Germany edges toward Chinese-style rating of 
citizens. Handelsblatt Global. https ://globa l.hande lsbla tt.com/
polit ics/germa ny-mass-surve illan ce-socia l-credi t-china -big-
data-88678 6. Accessed 15 July 2018
James W (1891) The principles of psychology. Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge
Jha A (2011) The mathematical law that shows why wealth flows to 
the 1%. The Guardian. https ://www.thegu ardia n.com/comme ntisf 
ree/2011/nov/11/occup y-movem ent-wealt h-power -law-distr ibuti 
on. Accessed 10 Sep 2018
Jøsang A, Ismail R, Boyd C (2005) A survey of trust and reputa-
tion systems for online service provision. Decis Support Syst 
43(2):618–644
Kant I (1996) Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals, translated by 
Gregor MJ. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Kantor J, Streitfeld D (2015) Inside amazon: wrestling big ideas in 
a bruising workplace. New York Times. https ://www.nytim 
es.com/2015/08/16/techn ology /insid e-amazo n-wrest ling-big-
ideas -in-a-bruis ing-workp lace.html?partn er=rss&emc=rss&_
r=0&mtrre f=undefi ned. Accessed 17 Oct 2018
Keen A (2016) Estonia: the country using tech to rebrand itself as the 
anti-Russia. The Guardian. https ://www.thegu ardia n.com/world 
/2016/apr/21/e-stoni a-count ry-using -techn ology -to-rebra nd-itsel 
f-as-the-anti-russi a. Accessed 28 Sep 2018
Kosner AW (2015) Google cabs and uber bots will challenge jobs 
‘Below The API’. Forbes. https ://www.forbe s.com/sites /antho 
nykos ner/2015/02/04/googl e-cabs-and-uber-bots-will-chall enge-
jobs-below -the-api/#63802 f8969 cc. Accessed 17 Oct 2018
Larson C (2018) Who needs democracy when you have data? MIT 
Technology Review. https ://www.techn ology revie w.com/s/61181 
5/who-needs -democ racy-when-you-have-data/. Accessed 28 Aug 
2018
Lessig L (2006) Code, version 2.0. Basic Books, New York
Mistreanu S (2018) Life inside China’s social credit laboratory. For-
eign Policy. http://forei gnpol icy.com/2018/04/03/life-insid e-china 
s-socia l-credi t-labor atory /. Accessed 7 Oct 2018
 AI & SOCIETY
1 3
Mittelstadt B, Allo P, Taddeo M, Watcher S, Floridi L (2016) The eth-
ics of algorithms: mapping the debate. Big Data Soc 3(2):1–21. 
https ://doi.org/10.1177/20539 51716 67967 9
Naafs S (2018) ‘Living laboratories’: the Dutch cities amassing data on 
oblivious residents. The Guardian. https ://www.thegu ardia n.com/
citie s/2018/mar/01/smart -citie s-data-priva cy-eindh oven-utrec ht. 
Accessed 22 June 2018
Naghizadeh P, Liu M (2016) Perceptions and truth: a mechanism 
design approach to crowd-sourcing reputation. IEEE ACM Trans 
Netw 24(1):163–176
O’Reilly T (2013) Open data and algorithmic regulation. In: Goldstein 
B, Dyson L (eds) Beyond transparency: open data and the future 
of civic innovation. Code for America Press, San Francisco, pp 
289–300
Priisalu J, Ottis R (2017) Personal control of privacy and data: estonian 
experience. Health Technol (Berlin) 7(4):441–451
Ricci F, Rokach L, Shapira B (2011) Introduction to recommender sys-
tems handbook. In: Ricci F (ed) Recommender systems handbook. 
Springer, Berlin, pp 1–35
Rosenblatt A (2018) When your boss is an algorithm, New York Times. 
https ://www.nytim es.com/2018/10/12/opini on/sunda y/uber-drive 
r-life.html. Accessed 17 Oct 2018
Russell S, Norvig P (2010) Artificial intelligence: a modern approach, 
3rd edn. Pearson International, Upper Saddle River
Scantamburlo T, Charlesworth A, Cristianini N (2019) Machine deci-
sions and human consequences. In: Yeung K, Lodge M (eds) 
Algorithmic regulation (forthcoming). Oxford University Press, 
Oxford
Smart PR, Shadbolt NR (2014) Social machines. In: Khosrow-Pour 
M (ed) Encyclopedia of information science and technology. IGI 
Global, Hershey
Solon O (2017) Big brother isn’t just watching: workplace surveillance 
can track your every move. The Guardian. https ://www.thegu ardia 
n.com/world /2017/nov/06/workp lace-surve illan ce-big-broth er-
techn ology . Accessed 11 July 2018
Solon O (2018) Amazon patents wristband that track warehouse work-
ers’ movements, The Guardian. https ://www.thegu ardia n.com/
techn ology /2018/jan/31/amazo n-wareh ouse-wrist band-track ing. 
Accessed 2 June 2018
Sullivan P (2018) Life insurance offering more incentive to live longer, 
The New York Times. https ://www.nytim es.com/2018/09/19/
your-money /john-hanco ck-vital ity-life-insur ance.html. Accessed 
20 Sep 2018
Thaler R, Sunstein C (2008) Nudge: improving decisions about health, 
wealth, and happiness. Yale University Press, London
Ticona J, Mateescu A, Rosenblat A (2018) Beyond disruption: How 
tech shapes labor across domestic work and ridehailing. Data Soc. 
pp 36–37
Van De Poel I, Royakkers L (2011) Ethics, technology, and engineer-
ing. An introduction. Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester
Van Dijck J, Poell T, de Waal M (2018) The platform society. Public 
values in a connective world. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Vassil K (2016) Estonian E-government ecosystem: foundation, appli-
cations, outcomes. Background paper for the World Development 
Report 2016, World Bank, Washington DC
Vermaas P, Kroes P, van de Poel I, Franssen M, Houkes W (2011) A 
philosophy of technology. from technical artefacts to sociotechni-
cal systems. Morgan and Claypool, San Rafael
von Ahn L, Dabbish L (2004) Labeling images with a computer 
game. In: Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on human fac-
tors in computing systems (CHI ‘04), pp 319–326. https ://doi.
org/10.1145/98569 2.98573 3
Waheed H (2018) The common good, the stanford encyclopedia of 
philosophy (Spring 2018 edition). In: Zalta EN (eds). https ://plato 
.stanf ord.edu/archi ves/spr20 18/entri es/commo n-good/. Accessed 
15 Oct 2018
Weber M (1978) Economy and society. University of California Press, 
Los Angeles
Wiener N (1948) Cybernetics, or control and communication in the 
animal and the machine. The MIT Press, Cambridge
Wiener N (1954) The human use of human being. Da Capo Press, 
Boston
Xiang Hui MS, Zequian S, Neel S (2016) Reputations and regulations: 
evidence from eBay. Manag Sci 62(12):3604–3616
Yeung K (2017) Algorithmic regulation: a critical interrogation. Regul 
Gov 12:505–523. https ://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12158 
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to 
jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
